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a b s t r a c t
The pervasiveness of Internet of Things results in vast volumes of personal data generated by smart
devices of users (data producers) such as smart phones, wearables and other embedded sensors. It is
a common requirement, especially for Big Data analytics systems, to transfer these large in scale and
distributeddata to centralized computational systems for analysis. Nevertheless, third parties that run and
manage these systems (data consumers) do not always guarantee users’ privacy. Their primary interest is
to improve utility that is usually ametric related to the performance, costs and the quality of service. There
are several techniques that mask user-generated data to ensure privacy, e.g. differential privacy. Setting
up a process formasking data, referred to in this paper as a ‘privacy setting’, decreases on the one hand the
utility of data analytics, while, on the other hand, increases privacy. This paper studies parameterizations
of privacy settings that regulate the trade-off betweenmaximumutility, minimumprivacy andminimum
utility, maximum privacy, where utility refers to the accuracy in the estimations of aggregation functions.
Privacy settings can be universally applied as system-wide parameterizations and policies (homogeneous
data sharing). Nonetheless they can also be applied autonomously by each user or decided under the
influence of (monetary) incentives (heterogeneous data sharing). This latter diversity in data sharing
by informational self-determination plays a key role on the privacy-utility trajectories as shown in this
paper both theoretically and empirically. A generic and novel computational framework is introduced
for measuring privacy-utility trade-offs and their Pareto optimization. The framework computes a broad
spectrum of such trade-offs that form privacy-utility trajectories under homogeneous and heterogeneous
data sharing. The practical use of the framework is experimentally evaluated using real-world data from
a Smart Grid pilot project in which energy consumers protect their privacy by regulating the quality of
the shared power demand data, while utility companies make accurate estimations of the aggregate load
in the network to manage the power grid. Over 20, 000 differential privacy settings are applied to shape
the computational trajectories that in turn provide a vast potential for data consumers and producers to
participate in viable participatory data sharing systems.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
High data volumes are generated in real-time from users’ smart
devices such as smartphones, wearables and embedded sensors.
Big Data systems process these data, generate information and
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enable services that support critical sectors of economy, e.g. health,
energy, transportation etc. Such systems often rely on centralized
servers or cloud computing systems. They are managed by corpo-
rate third parties referred to in this paper as data consumers who
collect the data of users referred to respectively as data producers.
Data consumers perform data analytics for decision-making and
automation of business processes. However, data producers are
not always aware of how their data are used and processed. Terms
of Use are shown to be limited and ineffective [1,2]. Security and
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privacy of users’ data depend entirely on data consumers and as
a result misuse of personal information is possible, for instance,
discrimination or limited freedom and autonomy by personalized
persuasive systems [3–6]. Giving control back to data producers by
self-regulating the amount/quality of shared data can limit these
threats [7]. Incentivizing the sharing of higher amount/quality of
data results in improved quality of service, i.e. higher accuracy in
predictions [8–10]. At the same time, data sharing empowers data
producers with an economic value to claim.
Several applications do not require storage of the individual
data generated by data producers. Instead, data consumers may
only require aggregated data. For instance, Smart Grid utility com-
panies compute the total daily power load or the average voltage
stability to prevent possible network failures, bottlenecks, predict
future power demand, optimize power production anddesign pric-
ing policies [11,12]. Privacy-preserving masking mechanisms [13],
i.e. differential privacy, accurately approximate the actual aggre-
gate values without transmitting the privacy-sensitive individual
data of data producers. Masking is a numerical transformation of
the sensor values that usually relies on the generation of random
noise and is irreversible.1
Privacy-preserving masking mechanisms are studied by calcu-
lating metrics of privacy q and utility u. The former represents the
amount of personal information that a data producer preserves
when sharing a masked data value. The latter represents the ben-
efit that a data consumer preserves when using certain masked
data for aggregation, e.g. accuracy in data analytics. Literature
work [13–15] shows that privacy and utility are negatively corre-
lated, meaning that an increase on one results in decrease on the
other. This paper studies the optimization of computational trade-
offs between privacy and utility that can be used to model infor-
mation sharing as supply–demand systems run by computational
markets [7,16]. These trade-offs can be measured by the opportu-
nity cost between privacy-preservation and the performance of al-
gorithmsoperating onmaskeddata, i.e. prediction accuracy. Trade-
offs can be made by choosing different parameters for different
masking mechanisms each influencing the mean or the variance
of the generated noise distributions [13]. Each parameterization
results in a pair of privacy and utility values within a trajectory of
possible privacy-utility values.
The selection of parameters formaskingmechanisms thatmax-
imize privacy and utility is studied in this paper as an optimiza-
tion problem [14,15]. In contrast to related work that exclusively
focuses on universal optimal privacy settings (homogeneous data
sharing), this paper studies the optimization of privacy-utility
trade-offs under diversity in data sharing (heterogeneous data
sharing). This is a challenging but more realistic scenario for
participatory data sharing systems that allow informational self-
determination via a freedom and autonomy in the amount/quality
of data shared by each data producer. A novel computational
framework is introduced to compute the privacy settings that
realize different privacy-utility trade-offs.
The main contributions of this article are the following: (i) The
introduction of a generalized, domain-independent, data-driven
optimization framework, which selects privacy settings that max-
imize privacy and utility. (ii) A formal proof on how high utility
can be achieved under informational self-determination (hetero-
geneous data sharing) originated from the diversity in the privacy
settings selected by the users. (iii) The introduction of new privacy
and utility metrics based on statistical properties of the generated
noise. (iv) The introduction of a new masking mechanism. (v)
An empirical analysis of privacy-utility trajectories of more than
1 It is computationally infeasible to compute the original data using the trans-
formed data.
20, 000 privacy settings computed using real-world data from a
Smart Grid pilot project.
This paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 includes related
work on privacy masking mechanisms, privacy-utility trade-off as
well as privacy-utility maximization problems. Section 3 defines
the optimization problem and illustrates the research challenge
that this paper tackles. Section 4 introduces the proposed opti-
mization framework. Section 5 outlines the experimental settings
on which the proposed framework is tested and evaluated. Sec-
tion 6 shows the results of the experimental evaluation. Finally,
Section 7 concludes this paper and outlines future work.
2. Related work
Several algorithms are proposed to perform data aggregation
without transmitting the raw data. The basic idea behind such al-
gorithms is to irreversibly transform2 the data, so that the original
values cannot be estimated.While doing so, some of the properties
of the data should be preserved to accurately estimate aggrega-
tion functions such as sum, count or multiplication [7,9,13,17,18].
The masking process enables the data producers to control the
amount of personal information sent to data consumers. These
methods also ensure that the data remain private evenwhen anon-
authorized party acquires them, for example in the case of a man-
in-the-middle attack.
2.1. Privacy-preserving mechanisms
An overview of privacy-preserving mechanisms is illustrated
below:
2.1.1. Perturbative masking mechanisms
Perturbative masking mechanisms allow the data producers
to share their data after masking individual values. Each value is
perturbed by replacing itwith a newvalue that is usually generated
via a process of random noise generation or vector quantization
techniques on current and past data values [13]. Some of the most
well-known perturbative masking methods are the following:
Additive noise. A privacy-preserving approach is the addition of
randomized noise [18–20]. This approach is often used in differ-
ential privacy schemes [19]. Differential privacy is ensured when
the masking process prohibits the estimation of the real data
values, even if the data consumer canutilize previously knowndata
values or the identity of the individual who sends the data [21].
Algorithms that achieve differential privacy rely on the notion that
the change of a single element in a database does not affect the
probability distribution of the elements in the database [18,20–
22]. Furthermore, the removed element cannot be identified when
comparing the version of the database before and after the re-
moval. This is achieved by adding a randomly generated noise
to each data value. The distribution of the random noise is pa-
rameterized and usually is symmetric around 0 and relies on the
cancellation of noises with opposite values. Increasing the number
of noise values also increases the noise cancellation, since a larger
number of opposite values are sampled. This property can be used
to combine differential privacy mechanisms in order to ensure
privacy while achieving high utility [23]. Statistical aggregation
queries on the masked data return an approximate numerical
result, which is close to the actual result. Differential privacy can
be applied to discrete and continuous variables for the calculation
of several aggregation functions [9]. Differential privacy can be
combinedwith the usage of deep neural networks [24,25], to apply
2 A process also known as masking.
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more complex aggregation operations on statistical databases. Fur-
thermore, several additive noise implementations are susceptible
to noise filtering attacks, such as the use of Kalman filters [26]
or reconstruction attacks [27]. These attacks can be prevented
when the noise is not autocorrelated or the distribution of its
autocorrelation is approximately uniform.
Microaggregation. Microaggregation relies on the replacement of
each data value with a representative data value that is de-
rived from the statistical properties of the dataset it belongs to.
A well-known application of microaggregation is K-anonymity.
K-anonymity relies on the notion that at least K original data
values are mapped to the same value [28]. When a crisp cluster-
ing algorithm is applied on the data, each data value is mapped
to the cluster centroid it belongs to. K is the minimum number
of elements in a cluster. Using crisp clustering techniques3 may
result in vulnerabilities to specific attacks, somembership or fuzzy
clustering is preferred instead [29]. Membership clustering assigns
a data point to multiple clusters with a probability that is often
proportional to the distance from each cluster centroid. For mem-
bership clustering techniques, usually large amounts of data are
required. The storage and computational capacity of sensor devices
cannot usually support such processes [13,29].
Synthetic microdata generation. An new dataset is synthesized
based on the original data andmultiple imputations [13]. The ‘‘syn-
thetic’’ dataset is used instead of the original one for aggregation
calculations. The application of synthetic microdata generation on
sensor devices may produce prohibitive processing and storage
costs. Furthermore, the availability of historical data on each sensor
device may not be adequate for such methods to achieve compa-
rable performance and efficiency with the perturbative masking
methods [13].
2.1.2. Encryption
Several approaches use encryption to produce an encrypted
set of numbers or symbols, known as ciphers. The aggregation
operations can be performed on the ciphers and produce an en-
crypted aggregation value. The encrypted aggregate value can
then be decrypted to the original aggregate one, with the us-
age of the corresponding private and public keys and decryption
schemes, providing maximum utility and privacy to the recipient.
The encrypted individual values cannot be transformed to the
original values without the usage of the appropriate keys from
an adversary, so maximum privacy is ensured. Currently, there is
extensive research on this area, and there has been a recent break-
through with the development of fully homomorphic encryption
schemes [17,30–32]. Homomorphic encryption schemes though
require high computational and communication costs, especially
when applied in large scale networks [33,34].
2.1.3. Multi-party computation
Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [35,36] can also be used for
privacy-preservation [37] by moving data from one device to
another. In such an approach, security and integrity of the data
depend on the resilience and security of the network. Most of
the methods that rely on encryption can calculate the exact sum
of the data, but they can also be violated if an attacker manages
to have access to the private key or uses an algorithm that can
guess it. Furthermore, in most cases they rely on communication
protocols that burden the system with extra computational and
communication costs [38]. These costs are often prohibitive for
devices such as IoT sensors and smartphone wearables in which
computational power and storage are limited [36].
3 Such as K-Means.
2.2. Privacy and computational markets
A supply–demand systemoperating on a computationalmarket
of data, can be created with the introduction of self-regulatory
privacy-preserving information systems [7]. Privacy preservation
is utilized to create such systems, for instance by using K-means
for microaggregation and different numbers of clusters for each
sensor. Varying the number of clusters produces different levels
of privacy and utility. The resulting trade-off between privacy and
utility is used to create a reward system, where data consumers
offer rewards for the data provided by the data producers. The
rewards are based on the demand of transformed data that enables
the estimation of more accurate aggregate values.
A reward system can be combined with pricing strategies from
existing literature on pricing private data [16], in which three
actors are introduced: Various pricing functions are proposed to
theMarketMaker so that theprivacy-utility of bothdata consumers
and data producers are satisfied. The optimization framework of
the current paper can utilize any parametric masking mechanism
of the literature mentioned in Section 2.1. The output of the op-
timization can be used along with pricing functions on participa-
tory computational markets, to create fully functional and self-
regulatory data markets.
2.3. Comparison and positioning
The challenge of an automated selection of privacy settings
that satisfy different trade-offs is not tackled in the aforemen-
tioned mechanisms. Privacy-utility trajectories have not been ear-
lier studied extensively and empirically as in the rest of this paper.
The optimization of privacy-utility trade-offs under diversity in
data sharing originated from informational self-determination is
the challenge tackled in this paper. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, this challenge is not the focus of earlier work.
3. Problem definition
Relatedwork [7,8,14,15,39] onprivacy-utility trade-offs focuses
on the parameter optimization of a single masking mechanism.
A masking mechanism is often a noise generation process, which
samples random noise values from a laplace distribution and then
it aggregates it to the data, for instance the sampled noise is then
added to the data to achieve differential privacy [18]. The result
of the optimization is usually a vector of parameter values θη,k,
for a masking mechanism ηand parameter index k. The pair of
the masking mechanism and the parameter values is referred as
a privacy setting fη
(
S, θη,k
)
of a set of sensor values S ∈ R1. This
privacy setting produces a pair of privacy-utility values qˆ , uˆ, such
that:
qˆ → max (Q ) (1)
uˆ → max (U) (2)
where (qˆ, uˆ) is a (sub-optimal) privacy-utility pair of values, which
is computed by an optimization algorithm that searches for the
optimal privacy-utility values pair. max (Q ), max (U) are the max-
imum privacy and utility values of a privacy value set Q and a
utility value set U . These sets are generated by the application of a
masking mechanism.
The optimization of an objective function that satisfies both
Relations (1) and (2) simultaneously is an NP-hard problem [15],
in the case that privacy and utility are orthogonal (q ⊥ u) or
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opposite4 (q ↑, u ↓), and often intractable to solve, since privacy-
utility trade-offs prohibit the satisfaction of both Relations (1) and
(2). Particularly, maximizing simultaneously utility and privacy
usually yields sub-optimal values, which are lower than the cor-
responding optimal values computed by optimizing each metric
separately [15]. Furthermore, such optimization is applicable for
statistical databases [13,21], where data are stored in a centralized
system. In such case, a specific privacy setting is chosen by the
designer/administrator of the system. As a result, this approach
relies on the assumption that a specific privacy setting should be
used by all data producers.
However, remaining to a fixed privacy setting may be limited
for data producers, especially when a data producer wishes to
switch to a different privacy setting to improve privacy further.
In this case, the optimization of different objective functions is
formalized in the following inequalities:
q∗ > qˆ+ δ ∧ u∗ > uˆ+ c (3)
where δ measures the change in privacy, which denotes whether
the data producers require higher privacy, δ > 0, or lower privacy
δ < 0, from the system. c measures the change in utility, which
denotes whether the data consumer demands lower utility, c > 0,
or higher utility c < 0, from the system. Finally, (q∗, u∗) denotes
a new (sub-optimal) pair of privacy-utility values, computed by
an optimization algorithm that searches for the optimal pair of
privacy-utility values with respect to the privacy requirements
of data producer and the utility requirements of data consumer
expressed by c and δ respectively.
The optimization of an objective function to satisfy Relation (3)
is also based on the assumption that all data producers agree to
use the same privacy setting. This means that data producers may
acquire a different privacy level by changing the value of δ via
the collective selection of a different privacy setting. Consequently,
a single privacy setting is generated and it produces a pair of
privacy-utility values, which satisfy Inequality (3). The value of δ
is determined via a collective decision-making process applied by
the data producers, e.g. voting between different privacy-utility re-
quirements. Such a system is referred to as a homogeneous privacy
system, where data producers are able to influence the amount of
privacy applied on the data by actively participating in the market,
nevertheless they all share the same value for δ. The data consumer
can bargain for higher utility by offering higher rewards to the data
producers to lower their privacy requirements.
Another challenge that arises is the optimization between pri-
vacy and utility when each user decides and self-determines a pre-
ferred privacy setting instead of using a universal privacy setting.
In such a scenario, inequality (3) is substituted by the following set
of inequalities:
(q∗1 > qˆ+ δ1) ∧ · · · ∧
(q∗n > qˆ+ δ|N|) ∧ (u∗ > uˆ+ c)
(4)
where δn measures the change in privacy which denotes whether
a data producer n belonging to a set of users N requires higher
privacy, δn > 0, or lower privacy δn < 0. q∗n denotes a new
(sub-optimal) privacy value for each data producer n. The value
is computed by an optimization algorithm that searches for the
optimal privacy value with respect the data producer’s privacy
requirements expressed by δn.
A system in which the inequalities of Relation (4) hold is re-
ferred to as an heterogeneous privacy system, where each data pro-
ducer self-determines and autonomously applies a privacy setting
4 In the case that privacy and utility are positive correlated (q ↑, u ↑), the
problem is reduced to NTIME-hard, and especially in the case privacy and utility
are proportional q ∝ u to DTIME-hard [40]. The solution of the problem is provided
by linearly evaluating all pairs of privacy and utility values oncewithout comparing
to all other pairs.
based on a preferred privacy value and an expected reward for
increasing system utility.
4. Framework
The design of a newprivacy preserving optimization framework
is introduced in this section to tackle the challenges posed in Sec-
tion 3. Additive noise masking mechanisms require a lower num-
ber of parameters in general and they are often used in privacy-
utility optimization [13,15,21]. Each privacy setting is illustrated
as an ellipse5 in Fig. 1a. Each point within the ellipse is a pos-
sible privacy-utility pair of values. The ellipse center is chosen
based on the privacy and utility mode of the setting. The mode is
the value with the highest density. In symmetric distributions, it
can be measured via the mean. The vertical radius of the ellipse
denotes the dispersion of utility values, while horizontal radius
denotes the dispersion of privacy values. Additive noise is stochas-
tic, which means that applying the same privacy setting on the
same dataset yields varying privacy-utility values. The choice of an
optimal privacy-utility pair cannot be achieved by only evaluating
the mode of privacy and utility for each privacy setting. If the
privacy-utility values of a privacy settingwith highutilitymode are
varying to a large extend, there is high probability that unexpected
non-optimal values are observed. To overcome this challenge, the
objective function of the parameter optimization algorithm selects
the parameters that minimize the dispersion6 of privacy-utility
values while maximizing the expected utility.
A data producer selects any privacy setting, among different
ones, that satisfies personal privacy requirements. The proposed
framework divides the range of privacy values in a number of
equally sized bins, as illustrated in Fig. 1b.Within each bin, a fitness
value is calculated for each privacy setting, based on privacy-
utility mode and dispersion Each privacy setting produces privacy
values with low dispersion. This is done by applying a lower bound
constraint on privacy and utility constraint on the dispersion of
privacy values and evaluating only privacy settings that satisfy this
constraint, as shown in Fig. 1c. The optimization framework eval-
uates several privacy settings, to find the parameters that achieve
maximum privacy-utility values that vary as little as possible. This
is illustrated in Fig. 1d in which the ellipses with the highest utility
mode and lowest utility dispersion are filtered for each privacy bin.
In a homogeneous data sharing system, a universal privacy set-
ting is selected by the data producers, via, for instance, voting [41].
Alternatively, in a heterogeneous system, the data producers self-
determine the privacy setting independently. Theorem 1 below
proves that aggregation functions can be accurately approximated
(utility can be maximized) even if different privacy settings from
the same of different masking mechanisms are selected.
Theorem 1. Let the transformation of |I| disjoint subsets of sen-
sor values Si into the respective subsets of masked values Mi using
a certain privacy settings fi for each such transformation. It holds
that the aggregation of the generated multisets of masked values Mi
approximates the aggregation of the sensor values multiset Si:
g(
|I|⋃
i=1
Mi)→ g(S), (5)
given that the commutative and associative properties hold between
each of the privacy settings fi and the aggregation function g.
5 The elliptical shape is chosen for the sake of illustration and it indicates a
symmetrical distribution of privacy-utility values, generated by a privacy setting,
within the ellipse area.
6 This refers to the dispersion measures of the privacy and utility distributions.
If the values belong to a Gaussian distribution, then the standard deviation is used
to measure the dispersion. Since this is not always the case, other measures of scale
can be used, such as the Inter-Quantile Range(IQR).
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Fig. 1. Agraphical representation of the algorithm. Each ellipse denotes the privacy-
utility values of a privacy setting. In Figs. 1c and 1d the varying color denotes the
fitness value. A lighter red color denotes higher fitness. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.)
Proof. Let a multiset of real sensor values S ⊆ R1 and |I| disjoint
subsets of S such that:
|I|⋃
i=1
Si = S, Si ̸= ∅ ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , |I|} (6)
Let a privacy setting f : S,Ψ → M be a pairwise element
operation between a set of sensor values Sand a set of noise values
Ψ , that transforms each sensor value s ∈ S by aggregating it with a
randomly selected noise valueψ fromΨ to produce amasked value
m:
f (S,Ψ ) = g(S ∪ Ψ ) = M ⇔
f (s, ψ) = g({s, ψ}) = m (7)
Let g : A → R1 be an aggregation function which aggregates all
elements of real values multisets S, Ψ , M ⊆ A ⊆ R1 into a single
real value g(A) = zA ∈ R1. Assume that g : A → R1 is defined
in a recursive manner so that it satisfies the following equation for
a multiset A and any union of all possible combinations of disjoint
subsets Ai that satisfy Relation (6):
g(A) = g(
|I|⋃
i=1
Ai) = g(
|I|⋃
i=1
g(Ai)) (8)
According to literature [42] the family of aggregation functions
that Relation (8) applies to is referred to as extended aggregation
functions.7 Thepairwise operation between s andψ in f is designed
in such way that it satisfies the commutative and associative prop-
erties when combined with the pairwise operation of g:
g(f (S,Ψ ))
(7), (8)= f (g(S), g(Ψ )) (9)
where g(Ψ ) → ι, ι is the strong neutral element of the extended
aggregation function g , such that:
g(g(A) ∪ ι) = g(A) ⇒
g(g(A) ∪ g(Ψ )) → g(A) (10)
This property is used in the noise cancellation of Section 2.1.1. Let
|I|multisetsΨi of noise that satisfy Relation (6), then the following
relation holds:
g(Mi) = g(f (Si,Ψi)) (9)⇔
g(Mi) = f (g(Si), g(Ψi)) (10), (7)⇔
g(Mi)→ g(Si),
(11)
whichmeans that each noisemultisetΨi is generated in such away
that the aggregation of g(Mi) approximates the aggregation of g(Si).
An illustrative example is the laplace noise used in the literature for
the aggregation functions of count or summation [18,34], which
satisfies Relations (7), (8) and (10). Now it can be proven that:
g(
|I|⋃
i=1
fi(Si,Ψi))
(8)= g(
|I|⋃
i=1
g(fi(Si,Ψi)))
(11)⇐⇒
g(
|I|⋃
i=1
Mi)→ g(
|I|⋃
i=1
g(Si))
(6), (8)⇐⇒
g(
|I|⋃
i=1
Mi)→ g(S)
(12)
Thus, Theorem 1 is proven. □
The practical implication of Theorem 1 is that the aggregation
of sensor values is approximated by the aggregation of masked
values produced by different privacy settings. The approximation
stands as long as the noise values produced by the different privacy
settings satisfy Relations (9) and (10). According to Relation (6),
each subset of sensor values should be masked by one privacy
setting. Regarding the complexity of these operations, applying
the masking on top of sensor values is linearly depended to the
number of sensor values |Si| assigned to each privacy setting. Due
to Relation Eq. (6), applying the proposed framework in real time
increases computational complexity by O(|S|). The original values
are not stored or transmitted at runtime, thus the storage and
communication complexity does not change. During optimization
all the privacy settings i ∈ I are applied to a training set of sensor
values S. In that case real sensor values are stored and transmitted
as well along with the masked values for each setting. The storage
and communication costs increase by O(|I| · |S|). The computation
costs also increase to O(|I| · |S|), which is a quadratic complexity in
the worst case |I| = |S|. In most real world applications, it is safe
to assume that the sensor values have considerably higher volume
to the evaluated privacy settings |I| ≪ |S|, thus the expected
computational, storage and communication complexity are linear
to the number of sensor values.
The framework can be applied as a multi-agent system. It re-
quires two types of agents representing the data consumers and
data producers. This scheme can be applied in both centralized and
7 A subset of those functions are the averaging functions, which include aggre-
gations such as the mean, weighted mean, Gini mean, Bonferroni mean, Choquet
integrals etc.
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decentralized aggregation services, such as MySQL or DIAS [43].
Finally in both heterogeneous and homogeneous systems, the data
consumer can influence the data producer’s choice by offering a
higher amount of reward to achieve a higher utility.
5. Experimental settings
This section illustrates the experimental settings, which are
used to empirically evaluate the proposed framework. A set of
sensor values S is used for the evaluation. Each sensor value sn,t
belongs to a user n and is generated at time t . For each sensor value,
a privacy setting that operates on the device of the data producer
masks the sensor value fη
(
sn,t , θη,k
)
by using the masking mech-
anism ηwith parameters θη,k. Two metrics are used to evaluate
privacy and utility.
5.1. Privacy evaluation
The main metric, which is used to calculate privacy, is the
difference of the masked value and the original value, which is
defined as the local error:
εn,t =
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐ fη
(
sn,t , θη,k
)− sn,t
sn,t
⏐⏐⏐⏐⏐ (13)
For a privacy setting to achieve a high privacy, a data consumer
should not be able to estimate the local error for the sensor values
sent by data producers. This is achieved by choosing privacy set-
tings that generate noise that is difficult to estimate. As it is shown
in the literature [7,13,15,21], the noise is difficult to estimate, if
it is highly random and causes a significant change in the original
value. To avoid noise filtering attacks, noise with low or no auto-
correlation is generated. The range of autocorrelation values can
be determined analytically when the noise generation function is
defined. In case this is not possible, a metric quantifying the color
of noise can be included in the objective function. Randomness
is evaluated by measuring the Shannon entropy [44] H (E ) of the
local error for all local error values E . The entropy is calculated by
creating a histogram of the error values and then applying the dis-
crete Shannon entropy calculation. Each bin of the histogram has a
size of 0.001. The significance of change is measured by calculating
the mean local error µ(E ) and standard deviation σ (E ). When
comparing privacy settings, higher mean, variance and entropy
indicate higher privacy [13]. In this article, the objective function
thatmeasures privacy for a privacy setting fη,k is defined as follows:
q = α1 µ(Eη,k)
max
(
µ(Eη,k)
) + α2 σ (Eη,k)
max
(
σ (Eη,k)
)
+α3
H
(
Eη,k
)
max
(
H
(
Eη,k
)) (14)
Where α1, α2, α3 are weighting parameters used to control the ef-
fect of each metric in the privacy objective function. max (•) is the
maximumobserved value for ametric during the experiments. This
value is produced by evaluating all privacy settings fη,k. Dividing
by this value, normalizes the metrics in [0, 1], so that the objective
function is not affected by the scale of the metric.
5.2. Utility evaluation
The utility of the system is estimated by measuring the error
the system accumulates within a time period, by computing an
aggregation function g (•) on the masked sensor values. Examples
of such aggregation functions are the daily total, daily average and
weekly variance of the sensor values. The accumulated error is
referred to as global error8 and is defined as:
ϵt =
⏐⏐⏐⏐g (Mt)− Stg (St)
⏐⏐⏐⏐ (15)
A sample set of global error values ϵ is created by applying the
masking process for a number of time periods of the dataset. The
mean, entropy and variance of the global error of a privacy setting
fη,k is calculated over this sample. The mean global error µ(ϵη,k)
indicates the expected error between the masked and actual ag-
gregate. The standard deviation σ (ϵη,k) and the entropy H
(
ϵη,k
)
of the global error, indicate how much and how often the masked
aggregate diverges from the expected value. Minimizing all three
quantities to 0, ensures that the masked aggregate approximates
the actual aggregate efficiently. Thus, after the global error sample
is created for each privacy setting, the corresponding utility objec-
tive function is calculated:
u=1−
(
γ1
µ(ϵη,k)
max
(
µ(ϵη,k)
)+γ2 σ (ϵη,k)
max
(
σ (ϵη,k)
)
+ γ3
H
(
ϵη,k
)
H
(
max
(
ϵη,k
))) (16)
where the weighting parameters γ1, γ2, γ3 are used to control the
effect of eachmetric in the utility objective function. max (•) is the
maximumobserved value for ametric during the experiments. This
value is produced by evaluating all privacy settings fη,k. Dividing
by this value, normalizes the metrics in [0, 1], so that the objective
function is not affected by the scale of the metric.
Recall from Section 4 that utility and privacy vary, when repeat-
ing the masking process for the same privacy setting and dataset
due to the randomness of the noise. A large sample to measure
this variance is created, by applying each privacy setting over
three times on the same dataset. Then the framework of Section 4
filters the privacy settings based on the mode and the scale of the
privacy-utility sample, as illustrated in Fig. 1c. The privacy-utility
samples for a privacy setting may not follow a symmetrical or
normal distribution.9 As a result, themaximization of the following
objective function is based on utility:
perc (U, 50)+ perc (U, 10) (17)
where perc(U, i) calculates the ith percentile of a set of utility
values U produced by the application of a privacy setting.
The factors that maximize Relation (17) are: (i) the value of the
mode, which is assumed to be approximated by the median and
(ii) the dispersion towards values lower than the median, which
is expressed by adding the 10th percentile to the median. The ob-
jective function evaluates the median and the negative dispersion
(10th percentile) of utility values. Positive dispersion is not taken
into account in the optimization, since the abstract objective of
the optimization is to ensure the least expected utility of a privacy
setting for the data consumers. The privacy is constrained by evalu-
ating only privacy settings inwhich the 10thpercentile differs from
the privacy median for at most ω, as shown in Inequality (18). The
8 The error function described in (13) and (15) is also known in literature as
absolute percentage error (APE) [45]. The error values are easy to interpret, as APE
measures the relative change of the sensor values and aggregate values by using
masking. Yet, when the denominator of the function is approaching zero, then the
absolute relative error cannot be calculated. If the sensor values are sparse, then
another error function can be used, such as MAPE.
9 It is confirmed in some experimental settings that some privacy settings gen-
erate samples of privacy-utility values that do not pass a Kolmogorov Smirnoff
normality test [46], and are also non-symmetrical.
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value of ω is constrained to be lower or equal to the bin size of the
optimization to ensure low privacy dispersion:
perc (Q , 50)− perc (Q , 10) < ω, (18)
Where perc(Q , i) calculates the ith percentile of a set of privacy
values Q produced by the application of a privacy setting.
6. Experimental evaluation
The proposed framework is evaluated experimentally by apply-
ing it to a real-world dataset. Privacy andutility are evaluated using
over 20, 000 privacy settings for empirical evaluation.
6.1. Electricity Customer Behavior Trial Dataset
The Electricity Customer Behavior Trial (ECBT) dataset contains
sensor data that measure the energy consumption for 6435 energy
data producers. The data are sampled every 30 minutes daily for
536 days. For the proposed framework, a set of sensor values Sof
|N| = 6435 users and |T | = 536 time periods. The total number of
sensor values in the set is |S| = 165, 559, 680. The sensor data are
considered private and the utility company managing the energy
network uses them to calculate daily total consumption in the grid,
to predict possible failures and plan power production. The daily
total consumption is an aggregation that can be defined as the
sum of all the sensor values generated during the day: g (St) =∑6435
n=1 sn,t . Around 10% of the daily measurements are missing
values, and are not included in the experiments. The significance
of themissing values reduces as the aggregation interval increases.
Therefore, a daily summation is chosen over more granular sum-
mation.
During the experiments, the local error of Relation (13) results
in a non-finite10 number only for a low number of maskings.
Hence, these values are excluded from the experiments, so that
the calculation of finite local error values is feasible. Concluding,
the proposed framework operates on 90% of the ECBT dataset.
6.2. Privacy mechanisms
Among several masking mechanisms [13], two ones are used
for the evaluation of the framework. Each mechanism is param-
eterized using the grid search algorithm11 [47]. The majority of
masking mechanisms are parameterized with real numerical val-
ues. A grid search discretizes these values, and then evaluates
exhaustively all possible combinations of parameter values.
6.2.1. Laplace masking mechanism
This mechanism is widely used in literature [9,13,21]. The
noise in the experiments of this paper is generated by sampling
a laplace distribution with zero mean. The scale parameter b of the
distribution is selected to ensuremaximumprivacy. Part of privacy
can be sacrificed to increase utility if the privacy requirements
from the data producers are not high. In this masking mechanism,
this is achieved by reducing the b. The scale parameter for each
laplace masking setting, is generated from value b = 0.001 and
during the parameter sweep the value increases by 0.001 until it
reaches b = 10.
10 The original sensor value is zero, therefore the result of Relation (13) is infinite
for non-zero noise or indefinite for zero-noise.
11 Also known as parameter sweep.
6.2.2. Sine polyonym masking mechanism
This mechanism is introduced in this paper. The mechanism
generates random noise that can be added to each sensor value.
Assume a uniform random variable υ . The noise generated from
the introduced masking mechanism is calculated as follows:
m =
|Ξ |∑
ξ=0
[θξ sin(2πυ)]2ξ+1 (19)
The coefficients of the polyonym are denoted as θξ , and ξ denotes
the index of the coefficient. Both the length of the polyonym |Ξ |
and the individual coefficient values can be tuned to optimize the
resulting privacy-utility values of the masking mechanism. The
generated noise is symmetrically distributed around zero, because
the odd power of the sine function produces both negative and
positive noise with equal probability. The sine function and its odd
powers are always symmetrical towards the horizontal axis,mean-
ing that
⏐⏐[θξ sin(2πυ)]2ξ+1⏐⏐ = ⏐⏐[−θξ sin(2πυ)]2ξ+1⏐⏐. Hence, the in-
tegral of each factor is zero
∫ 1.0
0 [θξ sin(2πυ)]2ξ+1dυ = 0. Therefore
the distribution of generated values is symmetrical around zero
for υ ∈ [0, 1], which denotes that the global error mean is
approximating zero. Increasing the length of the polyonym and the
values of its coefficients, increases themagnitude of the local error,
without affecting the global error, indicating that higher utility
can be achievedwithout sacrificing privacy. These propertiesmake
polyonyms of trigonometric functions, such as sine and cosine,
eligible candidates for additive noise optimization. By increasing
the polyonym length and tuning the coefficient values, a larger
space of privacy settings is searched to maximize privacy and
utility.
Each coefficient is assigned to a value in the space [0, 1.8]. The
grid search in that space starts with a step of 0.03 until the value
of 0.3, to evaluate settings that create low noise. Then the step
changes to 0.3 until the value of 1.8, to evaluate privacy settings
that generate higher values of noise. The sine polyonym masking
settings are generated by creating all possible permutations of
these values for 5 coefficients. This yields around 10,000 masking
settings. Preliminary analysis on the autocorrelation and the spec-
trograms of the proposed sine polyonym noise does not show au-
tocorrelation and recurring patterns over different spectrograms.12
6.3. Error analysis
Each privacy setting that results from parameterization of the
mechanisms is evaluated by analyzing the local and the global error
that they generate on varying subset sizes of the ECBT dataset.
By sampling varying sizes of the dataset, the utility and privacy
dispersion metrics are evaluated on a varying number of sensor
values, measuring the effect of varying participation in the system.
To create a random subset of the ECBT dataset, a subset of users
Ntest is chosen. In each repetition the users are chosen randomly. All
users use a universal privacy setting. The initial size of the subset is
50 users, and then it increases by 50 users until |Ntest| = 500 users.
Then, the size of the subset increases by 500 users until |Ntest| =
6435. This process generates several local and global error values.
The average, standard deviation and entropy of the local error and
global error are calculated for all samples generated from the above
process. The empirical cumulative distribution function13 (CDF) is
shown for each metric in Fig. 2.
12 Further analysis on this, is possible future work and is out of the scope of this
article. This can be evaluated by introducing a metric that measures noise color in
the privacy function.
13 The cumulative distribution function denotes the probability of a generated
value being lower or equal than the corresponding domain axis value [48].
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Fig. 2. Cumulative distribution function of each local and global error metric
computed by all settings of each masking mechanism.
The sine polyonym mechanism can produce a wider range of
local and global error values compared to the laplace mechanism,
since almost every sine polyonym CDF curve is covering a wider
domain range on the domain axis compared to the respective
laplace CDF curves. The majority of the range axis values of the
sine polyonym CDF curve are higher than the corresponding range
values of the laplace CDF curve. This indicates that it is more prob-
able to generate lower global or local error value by using a sine
polyonym setting compared to a laplace setting. Concluding, the
sine polyonym settings are expected to produce a wider range of
privacy-utility trade-offs. Based on the CDF charts, sine polyonym
settings are more likely to achieve higher utility, whereas laplace
settings are expected to achieve higher privacy.
6.4. Parameter analysis
For the experiments, α and γ parameters are defined to calcu-
late the privacy and utility. The choice of these parameters may
vary based on the distribution of the sensor values and the kind
of aggregation. Also data producers and data consumers may have
varying requirements that affect the choice of those values. In this
paper, these values are determined empirically, to showcase an
empirical evaluation. If a data consumer successfully calculates the
local error mean by acquiring the corresponding original values
of a masked set, then it is possible to estimate the original sensor
values of other masked sets as well, by subtracting the calculated
mean. This challenge is addressed by using privacy settings with
high noise variance. Still, high variance does not guarantee that
the masking process is not irreversible. If noise varies between a
small finite number of real values, then the data consumer can
also estimate the original value of the data by subtracting the
variance. To overcome this challenge, privacy settings that produce
noise with high entropy, therefore high randomness, are chosen.
Consequently, a lower value for the coefficient of local error mean
is chosen as α1 = 0.2, while entropy and standard deviation of the
local error share a higher coefficient value of α2 = α3 = 0.4.
Assigning values to the utility coefficients depends highly on
the preferences of the data consumer. In the case of sum, the
global error mean should be near 0, unless the data consumer
estimates the mean and then subtracts it from the aggregation
result. For this paper the main concern is to keep a global error
mean near zero, to avoid the aforementioned correction process.
Standard deviation and entropy are assigned with equal weight.
Therefore, a very high coefficient of γ1 = 0.6 for the global error
mean is chosen, whereas the coefficients of γ2 = γ3 = 0.2 for
global error, standard deviation and entropy are chosen. To avoid
evaluatingmechanismswith high utility dispersion and low utility
mode values, a hard constraint is applied and only mechanisms
that generate mean µ(ϵ) < 0.1 and standard deviation values
σ (ϵ) < 0.1 are evaluated. The normalizing factors of Relations (14)
and (16) are chosen after the application of this constraint.
A sensitivity analysis of the parameters for eachmaskingmech-
anism is performed to evaluate the effect of different parameter
values on the privacy and utility output of each masking mech-
anism. In the laplace masking mechanism, increasing the scale
parameter b of the distribution, also increases the total noise added
to the dataset. In the sine mechanism, increasing the number and
values of the coefficients, also increases the total generated noise.
In Fig. 3, a comparison of privacy and utility is shown between
the two types of mechanisms. The values of utility and privacy are
generated as shown in Section 6.3. The total noise is generated
by measuring the noise level of each privacy setting on a sample
of 100,000 sensor values.14 The lines are smoothed by applying
a moving average, to make the comparison clearer. For the same
amount of total absolute generated noise
∑
t |ψt |, the laplace
privacy settings achieve higher privacy, often more than 1% over
the sine polyonym privacy settings. The sine polyonym privacy
settings achieve higher utility around 1% over the laplace privacy
settings. Therefore the results illustrated in Fig. 2 are reflected in
the privacy and utility values generated from the above parame-
terization. Moreover, the trade-off between privacy and utility is
observable, as privacy increases with the decrease of utility and
vice versa for both mechanisms.
6.5. Homogeneous system evaluation
All the generated privacy settings are evaluated via the frame-
work proposed in Section 4. The proposed framework filters out
five privacy settings for five privacy bins of size 0.2. The constraint
value for evaluating privacy settings is chosen empirically to behalf
of the bin size ω = 0.1, to ensure low privacy dispersion, based
on Relation (18). The resulting privacy settings are summarized in
Table 1. The last two columns of the table, illustrate the median
privacy and utility values for each masking mechanism. The first
column shows the id of each setting, which is used as reference in
Figs. 4 and 5.
14 This sample size is chosen to be large enough for statistical significance and
small enough to reduce computation costs.
Please cite this article in press as: T. Asikis, E. Pournaras, Optimization of privacy-utility trade-offs under informational self-determination, Future Generation Computer
Systems (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.07.018.
T. Asikis, E. Pournaras / Future Generation Computer Systems xxx (xxxx) xxx 9
Fig. 3. Comparison of sine polyonym and laplace masking mechanisms in terms of
privacy and utility.
Fig. 4. Figs. 4a and 4c show the privacy-utility trajectory of the privacy settings
grouped by masking mechanisms in the same color. Figs. 4b and 4d illustrate the
trajectories of the privacy settings, which are generated by the proposed frame-
work. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader
is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 4a shows the generated privacy-utility values for all the
privacy settings tested. Each color ismapped to themaskingmech-
anism that is used to produce this setting. The line denotes the
median value of utility at the given privacy value. The non-median
privacy-utility values occur in the semi-transparent area. Upper
and lower edges of the area denote the minimum and maximum
utility value for the corresponding privacy value. Lower utility
values for a given privacy point are generated from applications
of the privacy setting on small subsets of the ECBT datasets, where
|N| ≤ 1000. The number of sensor values decreases with the num-
ber of users. Therefore, the noise cancellation is also reduced, as
Fig. 5. The heatmaps in Figs. 5a–5d show the privacy and utility median and IQR
values, for various distributions of privacy setting choices among the users.
mentioned in Section 2.1.1. Hence, subsets with a lower number of
sensor values produce lower utility values. The trade-off between
privacy and utility is quantified, since the median curve and the
edges of the surrounding area indicate a decrease in utilitywith the
increase of privacy. In Fig. 4b, the area of privacy-utility values of 5
privacy settings produced by the optimization process is shown in
Section 5.2. Furthermore the ‘‘no masking’’ privacy setting is also
considered, where users choose to use no privacy setting and send
the values unmasked.
As it is shown, the privacy values of each privacy setting are
within a range of lower than 0.2 privacy. The dispersion of utility
increases for privacy settings that achieve higher privacy. The
importance of offeringmore rewards for the usage of higher utility
mechanisms is validated, since high dispersion of utility is restric-
tive for accurate sum calculations by the data consumers. Figs. 4c
and 4d illustrate the privacy-utility trajectories formore than 1000
users. It is evident that a data consumer can also increase utility
and reduce its dispersion by attractingmore users. Higher rewards
in general, can also attract more users, so the utility dispersion is
expected to decrease even more.
6.6. Heterogeneous system evaluation
In an heterogeneous system, the framework performance is
evaluated under the use of different privacy settings from each
user. The difference of privacy and utility between homogeneous
and heterogeneous systems is quantified. This quantification is
donebyperforming an exhaustive simulation. The simulation com-
bines the ECBT dataset and the six privacy settings in Table 1.
Every user of the ECBT dataset is assigned a privacy setting from
Table 1. The percentage of users that are assigned each privacy
setting is parameterized A histogram with six bins is created. Each
bin corresponds to the ID of a specific privacy setting from Table 1.
The percentage assigned to a bin denotes the percentage of users
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Table 1
A table summarizing the performance of the five optimal privacy settings based on
the parameters of the sine polyonym denoting the coefficient value for each factor
of the polyonym or the scale value for a laplace mechanism. In case of the sine
polyonym, the first number from right is mapped to the first factor (ξ = 1) and
so on.
ID Masking Parameters Privacy Utility
A cosine 0.0-0.0-0.0-0.18-0.0 0.01 0.99
B laplace 0.005 0.20 0.98
C cosine 0.6-0.6-0.0-0.9-0.3 0.40 0.84
D cosine 1.2-0.3-0.6-1.2-0.9 0.60 0.76
E cosine 1.5-1.5-1.2-0.3-1.2 0.80 0.68
N None – 0.00 1.00
using the respective privacy setting at this time point. To gener-
ate several possible scenarios for different distributions of user
choices, the histogram is parameterized via a parameter sweep of
all possible percentage values for each setting, with a step of 12.5%.
This process produces over 1000 possible histograms. In Figs. 5a–
5d the heatmaps show the median and the interquantile range
(IQR)15 of privacy and utility for all histograms that the privacy
setting has a higher percentage of users compared to the others.
Such a setting is referred to as dominant setting. This sorting of
settings is done to examine the privacy-utility changes while users
move from a higher to the next lower utility setting. The top row of
the heatmap shows the homogeneous scenario case, where 100%
of the users chose only one setting.
The analysis of the heatmap in Fig. 5a shows an increase in
privacy when the majority of users choose the more privacy-
preserving settings of the homogeneous scenario. This effect is
observed for any percentage of users for a dominant setting. A
decrease in utility median is confirmed in 5c, when the majority of
users shifts from less private to more private settings. The trade-
off between privacy and utility is preserved in the heterogeneous
scenario, regardless of the percentage of users that choose the
dominant setting. Privacy values disperse more in heterogeneous
systems, according to Fig. 5b, as the percentage assigned to the
dominant setting drops. The dispersion of privacy can reach up to
0.16, which is still lower than the bin range. In terms of utility,
the dispersion is much lower on average. There is a dispersion
of around 0.1 for high utility mechanisms when they are dom-
inant with 87.5% of users. A possible explanation for this is the
reduction of noise cancellation of high privacy settings, due to
the low percentage of users choosing them. Concluding, changing
from a homogeneous system to a heterogeneous system preserves
the trade-off between privacy and utility in the median values.
Furthermore, the change to a heterogeneous system increases the
dispersion of privacy-utility values for all the mechanisms, so the
data consumer should expect the aggregates to be less accurate.
Still, utility remains over 0.76 even if the IQR is subtracted from the
median, indicating that the aggregate is still approximated even
in the heterogeneous case. This validates empirically Theorem 1.
In both cases it is efficient for the data consumer to shift user
privacy choices to high utilitymechanisms by offering themhigher
rewards. The randomness of the generated noise in an hetero-
geneous system does not create high variance or high expected
global errors. Individual privacy is still preserved for all users
and their privacy settings. The individual privacy value does not
change between heterogeneous and homogeneous systems, since
the privacy-setting choice of one user does not affect the added
noise to the sensor values of the other ones.
15 IQR is considered a robust measure of scale, which is especially used for non-
symmetric distributions. It measures the range between the 25th and the 75th
quantiles.
7. Conclusion and future work
An optimization framework for the selection of privacy set-
tings is introduced in this paper. The framework computes
privacy settings that maximize utility for different values of pri-
vacy. This framework can be utilized in privacy-preserving systems
that calculate aggregation functions over privatized sensor data.
The data producers of such system can self-determine the privacy
setting of their choice, since it is guaranteed that it produces the
desired privacy with very low deviation. For the data consumer
of the system, it is guaranteed that if the data producers are
incentivized to use low-privacy settings and high utility settings,
the approximated aggregate is highly accurate. Analytical aswell as
empirical evaluation using over 20, 000 privacy settings and real-
world data from a Smart Grid pilot project confirm the viability of
participatory data sharing under informational self-determination.
For future work, the proposed framework can be improved by
incorporating amachine learning process that computes personal-
ized recommendations of privacy settings to each data producer,
by identifying the prior distribution of the sensor data and also the
preferences of the data producer. Further empirical evaluations of
framework can be performed by implementing other aggregation
functions and using different datasets. Finally, an analytical proof
that the sine polyonym additive noise is not colored and differen-
tially private can be performed.
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Nomenclature
A A multiset of real values. Any capital letter is
treated as a multiset of real values, unless stated
otherwise.
g (A) a function that aggregates all elements of a set A
into a real value. e.g. for sum: gsum (A) =∑|A|i=0ai
µ(A) The mean value of all elements of a set, where
ai ∈ A.
m (A) The median value of all elements of a set, where
ai ∈ A.
max (A) Themaximumvalue of all elements of a set, where
ai ∈ A.
min (A) Theminimum value of all elements of a set, where
ai ∈ A.
H (A) The Shannon’s entropy value for all elements of a
set, where ai ∈ A.
aˆ A suboptimal value that approaches an optimal
value, e.g. aˆ → max (A) or aˆ → min (A).
a∗ A new suboptimal value that approaches an exist-
ing suboptimal value aˆ.
n A user
N A set of users
t A time index
sn,t A sensor value generated in time tby the user n
η a masking mechanism, which consists of a para-
metric algorithm that masks the sensor values of
a multiset S.
θη,k A parameterization kfor a masking mechanism η.
16 http://www.asset-consumerism.eu/.
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υ A uniformly distributed variable.
fη
(
S, θη,k
)
a privacy setting consisting of a masking mech-
anism ηparameterized with parameters θη,kand
operating on a set of sensor values S. It produces a
masked set of sensor values fη
(
S, θη,k
) = M , such
that |S| = |M|.
Q A multiset of privacy values.
αi A parameter that weights the importance of pri-
vacy factors for calculating the privacy values.
δ A parameter that denotes the amount of privacy
that the data producer sacrifices or gains over the
existing privacy.
c A parameter that denotes the amount of utility
that a data consumer sacrifices or gains over the
existing utility value.
U A multiset of utility values.
αi A parameter that weights the importance of pri-
vacy factors for calculating the utility values.
γi Aparameter thatweights the importance of utility
factors for calculating the utility values.
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